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Financial scandals: a historical overview
STEVEN TOMS*
Business School, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom
I examine the incidence of fraud from c.1720 to 2009 and relate it to the occurrence of
signiﬁcant ﬁnancial scandals. Focusing on the UK, and US prior to Enron, and using a
detailed dataset of signiﬁcant events and news content, underpinned by examination of
speciﬁc watershed scandals, the paper highlights the regulatory response to scandals and the
implications for accounting and ﬁnancial reporting. The evidence reveals the incidence of
fraud and ﬁnancial scandal to be historically contingent and skewed towards certain sectors,
particularly banking and ﬁnance, facilitated by complex group structures and international
capital mobility, and mediated by managerial incentives and ownership concentration.
Financial reporting and auditing can mitigate fraud opportunities in all sectors and
businesses without complex group structures, and the accounting profession achieved some
success in this respect up to the mid-1970s. Since then, the profession has been increasingly
challenged by, and to some degree implicated in, the development of interconnected and
international business networks, which, combined with wider ﬁnancial deregulation, has led
to a resurgence of fraud and ﬁnancial scandal not previously experienced since the mid-
nineteenth century.
Keywords: ﬁnancial scandal; fraud; accounting manipulation; ﬁnancial reporting audit;
regulation
1. Introduction
I present a historical overview of ﬁnancial scandals and offer an explanation of their frequency
and extent. Financial scandals appear more prevalent in certain historical periods, cluster by
type, and may constitute watersheds, determining the character of regulatory response. History
also reveals periods when certain groups: shareholders, managers, or intermediaries, have been
relatively more or less powerful, impacting on the extent and character of fraud and ﬁnancial
scandal. Financial reporting has an ambiguous role, limiting or facilitating opportunities for
fraud and ﬁnancial scandals.
A ﬁnancial scandal typically has three components. First, it is an event or situation (the
context in terms of time and place) involving the employment of ﬁnancial resources, second,
there is questionable ethical behaviour (judged against social norms of accepted behaviour),
and third, there is wide public knowledge (the signiﬁcance of its consequences).1 For the purposes
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of the present analysis, therefore, a ﬁnancial scandal is deﬁned as: A situation or event that has
occurred as a result of ﬁnancial resources being employed in a morally questionable manner
where there are serious consequences for third parties, which are widely known. According to
this deﬁnition ﬁnancial scandals may involve accounting and ﬁnancial market manipulation, mul-
tiple types of fraud, and accentuate the possibility of corporate bankruptcy. Morally questionable
ﬁnancial behaviour may be commonplace without being scandalous, so it is the effect on innocent
third parties, and wider public knowledge of those consequences, that create the scandal. The
ﬁnancial impact must therefore be widespread, in terms of individuals affected losing their
money, and diminution of trust in ﬁnancial institutions to effectively safeguard the public’s invest-
ments. The larger are the collateral losses of such behaviour, the greater is the scandal’s percep-
tion, social impact, and public appetite for ﬁnancial regulation and reform.
Using this deﬁnition, I contribute to the literature by quantifying the extent of fraud and ﬁnancial
scandal through time and offering an explanation of its variation. To do this, in section 2 I brieﬂy
review generic historical explanations of fraud andﬁnancial scandal. Section 3 presents new empiri-
cal evidence on the patterns of fraudulent behaviour over extended time periods, based on content
analysis of contemporary news sources in the United Kingdom 1715–2009 and the United States,
1850–2009, and a database of 221 British corporate scandals, 1800–2009. Taken together, I use the
trends in the data to contextualise ﬁve examples of major ﬁnancial scandals, which had signiﬁcant
impacts on accounting and auditing practice, examined in detail in section 4. The scandals are drawn
from the United Kingdom and the United States, reﬂecting the dominance of these jurisdictions in
the relevant literature and their readiness to transfer accounting practices. I examine these chrono-
logically: The South Sea Bubble, 1720; the City of Glasgow Bank, 1878; McKesson & Robbins,
1937; Penn Central, 1970 and Polly Peck International, 1990. I selected each case because it was
a watershed, highlighted as such in the prior literature, such that their position could be re-evaluated
in the context of historical trends, detailing the regulatory responses and the role of ﬁnancial report-
ing. Section 5 concludes by summarising the historical evidence in relation to prior interpretations
of the determinants of fraud and ﬁnancial scandal, offering an explanation of why the opportunity to
engage in fraudulent ﬁnancial behaviour varies so much over time and setting out the implications
for the accounting profession, regulation and ﬁnancial transparency.
2. History of fraud: the long view
Notwithstanding recent interest in ﬁnancial scandal and fraud following the global ﬁnancial crisis,
much of the literature remains time and case speciﬁc, only occasionally comparing experiences
over many decades or centuries. This brief literature review therefore excludes case-speciﬁc
research, which is instead dealt with, as applicable, in the discussion of example scandals in
section 4.
Relatively few long run studies offer generalised explanations of fraudulent ﬁnancial behav-
iour. Cooper et al. (2013) note also that there is little theorisation. Perhaps Jones (2011) offers the
broadest perspective, based on 18 scandals across six geographical locations from the third mil-
lennium BC to the 1980s, complemented by a range of post-1980s studies. He concludes that
fraud occurs in ﬁrms that are badly managed in some signiﬁcant respect, leading to collapse
and public opprobrium. Focusing on recent events on Wall Street, Gray et al. (2005) also
provide some perspective from the earliest speculative bubbles of the eighteenth century, to con-
textualise unethical behaviour by leaders of corporations and investment institutions, conﬂicts of
interest and poor regulation. Misplaced behaviour by corporate leaders, in the form of hubris,
status seeking, or acting to cover mistakes, is a common feature of many longer run studies,
and indeed a perennial feature, creating an enduring policy dilemma between promoting entrepre-
neurship and regulating against ﬁnancial dissembling (Balleisen 2017, p. 13).
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Other studies, albeit of more limited scope, have drawn similar conclusions. In nineteenth-
century Britain, Taylor (2013) attributes the rise in fraud opportunity to the emergence of the
joint stock company and the lack of funding for effective regulation. In similar vein, the
growth of larger businesses, with more complex ﬁnancial structures, was facilitated, according
to Robb (2002), by a dominant laissez faire ideology that limited regulatory intervention. In
the second half of the nineteenth-century ﬁnancial crime was nonetheless recognised criminal cat-
egory, requiring a speciﬁc response (Wilson 2014) and regulation was accordingly fashioned by
lawyers rather than accountants (Lee et al. 2009, p. 416). Consequently, the regulatory framework
evolved as business problems arose, often in the form of ﬁnancial scandals.
Much of the literature then, equates fraud and ﬁnancial scandal with the rise of the large corpor-
ation andweakness in knee jerk regulatory response. Lee et al. (2008) link ﬁnancial manipulation to
dominant senior managers in such large organisations in Britain, the US and Australia since the
middle of the nineteenth century, highlighting executives’ ability to neutralise governance and
accountability mechanisms (Gwilliam and Jackson 2011). Skeel (2005, p. 7) identiﬁes the
‘Icarus’ effect, where hubristic managers in large, complex and competitive corporations engage
in excessive risk. In what Skeel characterises as a ‘cat and mouse’ game, regulators attempt to
limit scandals by curtailing risk-taking, empowering market scrutineers, including accountants,
and limiting the size of corporations. Scandals may thus be an antecedent to regulation, which as
Hail et al. (2018) demonstrate, then typically fails to mitigate the incidence of future scandals, so
that although the level of regulation quantitatively increases, it has no real effect.
Regulation then, including accounting regulation, cannot be judged according to its quantitat-
ive extent alone. Accounting regulation in particular, may be permissive as well as restrictive. For
example, in ﬁve cases of accounting rule changes in the period c.1975–1990, there was no ten-
dency towards restrictive standardisation or ﬂexibility, only a cyclical pattern (Nobes 1991). In
general, as accounting regulations are modiﬁed in either direction, these changes in turn may
reﬂect wider contexts of deregulation and self-regulation, thereby impacting on fraud opportunity.
In such fashion, the emergence and growth of the accounting profession has been an important
response to ﬁnancial crime. Cycles of signiﬁcant individual or clusters of scandals have thus
spurred reform of regulation, accounting practice and the accounting profession (Clikeman
2013, p. 2, Carnegie and O’ Connell 2014), but the changes have been insufﬁcient to prevent
new scandals. The choices of the accounting profession have reinforced these tendencies over
time, informed by increasing dominance of business advice over shareholder protection,
leading to the marginalisation of fraud detection and the emergence of the ‘audit expectation
gap’ (Maltby 2009, pp. 234–235). Taking a transatlantic perspective and historical evidence
dating back to the Italian Renaissance and before, Brooks (2018) suggests the expectation gap
has a long history, compounded by conﬂict of interest and over-concentration of accounting ﬁrms.
In summary, these explanations, almost of necessity, deal with efﬁcient market violations in
some form. After all, as Ackerman (1978, p. 208) suggests: ‘If the economy is fully competitive,
then no corruption can occur’. Following similar logic, fraud, corruption, mis-selling, etc., are not
possible in an efﬁcient capital market. In such circumstances, transparency would ensure the
alignment of risk and responsibility. Misalignments are explained for the most part in the literature
discussed thus far by the presence of large, complex organisations, with dominant senior man-
agers or insiders, posing problems for outside regulators. Many of these studies also suggest
that ﬁnancial scandals are cyclical, or even perennial. The more general literature on fraud and
ﬁnancial scandal gives substantial weight to generic models like the fraud triangle, informed
by individual psychological and case-speciﬁc circumstances (for example, Murphy and Dacin
2011). Such explanations are clearly important, but might certain institutional conﬁgurations
be more effective than others at mitigating the opportunities for individual fraudulent behaviour?
In a major international comparative study of 26 countries, for the period 1800–2015, Hail et al.
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(2018), show that country-speciﬁc characteristics of market development and legal tradition shape
the effectiveness of regulatory response to scandals. Baumol (1996) uses another analytical
approach to contrast major historical periods and jurisdictions which tended to promote the
supply of ‘productive’, ‘unproductive’ and ‘destructive’ entrepreneurs, with fraudulent behaviour
an example of the latter category. In an analysis of British evidence beginning in the early eight-
eenth century, Toms (2017) links fraud opportunity to the dynamic interaction of technical inno-
vation and mechanisms of ﬁnancial scrutiny.
Extending these approaches, the paper examines which institutional arrangements mitigate
fraud, or promote it, for signiﬁcant historical periods. Relatedly, it also considers whether or
not prevailing institutional arrangements are established or punctured by major watershed scan-
dals. Further, it considers how is accounting implicated in these watershed moments, as part of the
problem and as part of the solution. To answer these questions, the next section of the paper con-
siders ﬁrst, the level and nature of fraudulent activity since the early eighteenth century. Once
trends and turning points are established, in subsequent sections, I review watershed scandals
in their wider context, and the response to them, including the consequences for accounting
and ﬁnancial reporting.
3. Fraud: some long run empirical trends
The gaps in the above literature can be usefully addressed by examining long run trends. Figure 1
uses a popularity index of British newspapers to illustrate the relative incidence of the keyword
search term fraud’ from 1715 to 2009. 2 Fraud is perhaps the most useful term for identifying
trends spanning several centuries. It was used as an umbrella term in the nineteenth century,
and had less speciﬁc contextual meaning than similar terms like ‘corruption’ (Taylor 2013,
p. 2) and this remains true up to the present day. Other terms, like, ‘swindle’, ‘false balance
sheet’, ‘ﬁnancial scandal’, ‘creative accounting’ pass in and out of use. For example, a popularity
index using ‘ﬁnancial scandal’ showed few references to ﬁnancial scandal in the press prior to
1890, notwithstanding events that conform to the deﬁnition set out earlier, and creative account-
ing only entered the public domain in the 1980s (Gwilliam and Jackson 2011, p. 380). There are
also much earlier examples of terms passing out of use. So-called ‘Old Corruption’, associated
with the sinecures of government ofﬁce, had been pervasive in the period since the South Sea
Bubble (Levy Peck 1989), but declined in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century (Rubinstein
1983). Figure 2 shows that popularity index values for ‘corruption’ and other terms associated
Figure 1. ‘Fraud’ popularity index, 1715–2009. Source: Calculated from Gale Cengage online database
of British newspapers. Note: Popularity (Pop. %) = number of documents featuring ‘fraud’ divided by all
relevant documents, where a relevant document is a news story published in the ‘News’, ‘Business
News’ and ‘Opinion and Editorial’ section of a newspaper/periodical as deﬁned by the Cengage database.
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with petty ﬁnancial crime, ‘forgery’ and ‘counterfeit’, declined substantially in the same period.
So, although useful for highlighting particular patterns of behaviour in speciﬁc periods, unlike
‘fraud’ these terms do not provide a consistent long run measure.
Bearing in mind that fraud is a highly generic term, it constitutes a useful ethical barometer, if
other context-speciﬁc forms of deceit are discounted. For example, in Figure 2, I show that the
generally high level of the popularity index for ‘fraud’ in the pre-1850 period appears to be associ-
ated with the trends for ‘forgery’, ‘corruption’ and ‘counterfeit’. Factoring the decline of these
previously socially embedded types of fraud, Figure 1 nonetheless suggests a sharp rise in frau-
dulent activity in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. The increase was associated with
the spread of the joint stock company and two key sectors: railways and banking. In Figure 3 I
highlight the incidence of fraud in these sectors, which explains the mid-nineteenth century
peak, and also the subsequent decline into the twentieth century, that feature in Figure 1.
A further striking feature of Figure 1 is the relatively low incidence of fraud in the middle
decades of the twentieth century, particularly the period c.1940–1970. This ‘hiatus’ is robust to
changes in the term used, such that the popularity index for any synonym for fraud demonstrates
a similar pattern. Another feature is the apparent ‘rebound’, post-1970, which again is robust to
alternative measurement using similar terms. Moreover, the hiatus and rebound pattern is obser-
vable in similar tests on US data.3 The turning point persists when examining the terms ‘ﬁnancial
scandal’ (Figure 4) and ‘creative accounting’. These terms are relatively new and supersede terms
like ‘swindle’ and ‘false balance sheet’, both of which peaked prior to the 1940–1970 hiatus.4
Figure 4 shows sharp increases in the appearance of ‘ﬁnancial scandal’ in the British and US
press after 1970. In a similar analysis, Hail et al. (2018) also identify sharp upturns for Britain
and the US from the 1970s.5
To summarise the overall pattern in Figures 1–4, up to c.1840 fraudulent activity was domi-
nated by petty ﬁnancial crime and corruption, not headline ﬁnancial scandals, followed by a
ﬂurry of scandals in railways and banking in the period c.1840–1870 coinciding with economic
expansion and joint stock ﬁnance. The period from c.1870 shows a secular decline, culminating
in a post-1940 hiatus that persisted until 1970, followed by a rebound towards previous levels
by the end of the century. It is also noteworthy in Figure 2 that the long downward trend for
‘corruption’ is reversed in the later twentieth century and through the global ﬁnancial crisis of
2007–2008.
Figure 2. Generic ﬁnancial crime, 1715–2009. Source: Calculated from Gale Cengage online database of
British newspapers. Note: Popularity (Pop. %) for each term = number of documents featuring: ‘forgery’,
‘corruption’ ‘counterfeit’ divided by all relevant documents, where a relevant document is a news story pub-
lished in the ‘News’, ‘Business News’ and ‘Opinion and Editorial’ section of a newspaper/periodical as
deﬁned by the Cengage database.
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The task of the remainder of the paper is to explain these trends, with a particular emphasis on
the role of ﬁnancial reporting, either as a mitigator, or as an enabler, of ﬁnancial fraud. To do so, I
constructed a database of corporate scandals based on the data in Figures 1 and 4 in conjunction
with other sources, highlighting their dominant characteristics with reference to sector, structural
and international dimensions (Appendix 1). In conjunction, landmark cases of ﬁnancial fraud are
reviewed, and reinterpreted in the context of the wider trends. The analysis in the next section
below begins with the South Sea Bubble of 1720, which forms a backdrop to the period domi-
nated by corruption and petty ﬁnancial crime up to c.1840. I illustrate the character of fraud
that persisted after the introduction of joint stock company legislation from the 1840s and the
regulatory and institutional changes leading up to and following from the City of Glasgow
Bank crash of 1878. I then review the effects of the Wall Street crash with a focus on a series
of key frauds on both sides of the Atlantic, with a particular focus on the post-SEC McKesson
Figure 3. ‘Bank’ ‘Railway’ fraud popularity index, 1820–2009. Source: Calculated from Gale Cengage
online database of British newspapers. Note: Popularity (Pop. %) for each term = number of documents fea-
turing: ‘bank’, ‘railway’ divided by all relevant documents featuring fraud (per ﬁgure 1).
Figure 4. ‘Financial Scandal’, UK and US, 1850–2009. Source: UK news calculated from Gale Cengage
online database of British newspapers. New York Times calculated from Historical New York Times online
database hosted by Proquest. Note: UK news popularity % = number of documents featuring ‘ﬁnancial
scandal’ divided by all relevant documents, where a relevant document is a news story published in the
‘News’, ‘Business News’ and ‘Opinion and Editorial’ section of a newspaper/periodical as deﬁned by the
Cengage database. New York Times = actual frequency of the term ‘ﬁnancial scandal’. For purposes of com-
parison, both series are indexed to = 100 for 2000–2009.
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& Robbins scandal of 1937, identifying some reasons for the 1940–1970 hiatus period. Scandals
of the late 1960s and early 1970s are considered next and I show how they reﬂected the rise of the
market for corporate control, for example, the Pennsylvania Railroad (referred to as Penn Central)
case of 1970. Finally, I explain the post-1970 rebound, with a focus on the wave of bank and
accounting manipulation frauds in the UK after 1980, using the Polly Peck International case
of 1990 as a speciﬁc example.
4. Watershed ﬁnancial scandals
4.1. The South Sea Bubble and its aftermath
The great South Sea Bubble scandal of 1720 marked a watershed event in British economic
history, and is therefore a useful starting point for our analysis. The scandal had features that
were common to many subsequent scandals and set the regulatory agenda for many decades.
Investors were misled with false information, politicians were bribed, and dividends were paid
out of capital (Jones 2011). The Bubble featured not just the South Sea Company, but also
many other joint stock companies, often ﬂoated on prospectuses of dubious content (South Sea
Company 1825). Losses were signiﬁcant and widespread across society, ranging from famous
individuals like Isaac Newton to small investors (Paul 2010). Meanwhile, the Act of 17206
imposed signiﬁcant restrictions on incorporation.
The general effect was a low incidence of corporate fraud after 1722 and through the early part
of the nineteenth century. The only signiﬁcant headline scandals were the cluster that occurred in
1731 surrounding the Charitable Corporation, York Building Company, and further fears sur-
rounding the South Sea Company (Taylor 2013, p. 8), explaining the spike in Figure 1.7 More
commonly, frauds were associated with individual conﬁdence tricksters, and were transaction
or product speciﬁc. Examples included counterfeiting, weights and measures, patent infringe-
ments, bills of exchange, petty bank fraud etc., explaining the pattern of generic ﬁnancial
crime into the early nineteenth century in Figure 2.8 By contrast, Robb (2002, p. 147) notes
that elite misconduct was a relatively minor social ill.
The relatively low incidence of high-level corporate fraud and scandal during this period can
be explained by effective shareholder scrutiny coupled with criminal sanctions for individual mis-
demeanours. As the Bubble had enriched insiders, temporarily at least, the balance now swung to
the outside investor. There were three dimensions to this. First, groups of promoters were subject
to greater political scrutiny. Limited liability was restricted, but not banned, such that proposed
incorporations required parliamentary approval (Freeman et al. 2012). Second, fraudsters were
subject to severe criminal penalties (Taylor 2018). Third, shareholders enjoyed rights to access
and inspect company accounts in most joint stock companies and also a substantial number of
unincorporated businesses (Freeman et al. 2012, pp. 214–215). Shareholders could access the
books at the general meeting with the audit conducted at the same time (Taylor 2018), in what
might be termed an ‘open-access’ system. A possible reason why such access rights were sus-
tained, until the early nineteenth century at least, was that ﬁrms did not operate in a competitive
environment. Once approved, a corporation might also be granted a monopoly over its speciﬁed
activity, so there was no incentive for secrecy on the grounds of commercial conﬁdentiality.
Secrecy prevailed only in some sectors, notably ﬁnancial services, where there was concern
about providing competitors with access to policyholders’ details (Freeman et al. 2012, p. 216).
These protections for outside investors set the context for fraudulent behaviour for the century
after the Bubble Act. Rules encouraged collusion between company promoters and political insi-
ders leaving outside shareholders potentially vulnerable, for example to dishonest share appro-
priations. Following the East London Water Works Company failure of 1807, two dishonest
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individuals, Mainwaring and Hubbard, were censured (Freeman et al. 2012, pp. 44–45), but there
was no pressure for systemic reform. An important reason for this outcome was that the injured
shareholders used legal process to recover the full value of their investments. The single large
scandal of 1720 and its systemic impact contrast with subsequent smaller frauds where conse-
quences could be easily isolated and deviant behaviour punished (Taylor 2013). In summary,
the effectiveness of this model was based on shareholders, empowered through focused knowl-
edge and intervention mechanisms, backed by criminal sanctions.
The ﬁnancial crisis of 1825 illustrated some limitations of the narrow investment base, and of
unlimited liability in the banking sector, which made the liquidity crisis much worse. The result
was the introduction of limited liability joint stock companies, ﬁrst in banking then in the wider
economy in the 1850s (Turner 2014). Meanwhile, the active shareholder model gradually broke
down as new, often middle-class investors, were drawn ﬁrst into certain industries, banks and rail-
ways, and then the wider economy.
4.2. Railways, banks and the City of Glasgow Bank scandal
The spread of incorporation after the Acts of 1844 and 18559 facilitated the new middle-class
investors’ involvement in railways and banks (Wilson 2014). New technology, the structure of
ﬁnancial institutions and a permissive regulatory framework with underdeveloped mechanisms
of accountability for directors explain the mid-nineteenth century peak in frauds in Figure 1.
The City of Glasgow Bank (CGB) of 1878 scandal was a watershed that marked the end of
this period.
Before then, the rapidly expanding rail network demanded new capital on an unprecedented
scale, and this was provided from the savings of new investors. Company promoters and other
market insiders were in a strong position to exploit lax structures of regulation and accountability.
In 1845, the ﬁrst of the peak years in Figure 3 for railway associated frauds; the practice of secur-
ing shares certiﬁcates by deception became widespread.10 Speculation in railway shares contrib-
uted to the general ﬁnancial crisis of 1847, resulting in a series of investigations, most notably into
the Eastern Counties Railway (ECR) and its directors (Edwards 2013, p. 143). The ECR was one
of George Hudson’s companies, along with three others, in which fraud involved false reporting
of ﬁnancial results and the payment of dividends from capital (Jones 2011, p. 120), resulting in
losses to investors on a scale not seen since the South Sea Bubble. Although Hudson was the
highest proﬁle case, these problems were widespread. Dividends became a device used by direc-
tors to reassure non-technical investors and avoid shareholder scrutiny (Robb 2002, p. 44, Turner
et al. 2013),11 but they also incentivised ﬁnancial manipulation, resulting in systematic losses for
substantial numbers of investors (Bryer 1991).12
From the 1860s, railway frauds declined (Figure 3) and this can be explained in part by pre-
scriptive legislation on company accounts. From 1868, an Act required railways to publish stan-
dardised regulated and detailed accounts (Matthews 2006, p. 7).13 A measure of the effectiveness
of this regulation is that, of 14 identiﬁable corporate scandals involving railways during the nine-
teenth century, all occurred prior to 1868.14
During the same period, banking frauds were of equal prominence and equally serious in
terms of wider consequences. A series of bank failures culminated in the Royal British Bank col-
lapse of 1856. The directors had been speculating in Welsh mining investments and paying divi-
dends out of capital. The press interpreted these events as the failure of the whole system,
referring to ‘embezzlement mania’ (Taylor 2007, Taylor 2013, p. 109).15 In similar vein, the
Overend Gurney scandal of 1866 resulted in the failure of other ﬁnancial houses and over 200
other joint stock organisations. The crisis was precipitated by the failure of the Joint Stock Dis-
count Company, and one of the directors, James Freeling Wilkinson, was given an unprecedented
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prison sentence under the Larceny Act. The press welcomed the sentence, but it sent a shockwave
through the City, where company directors had considered themselves immune from prosecution
(Taylor 2013, p. 138). The Overend Gurney crisis erupted when the directors issued a call for
further capital. Shareholders objected, and formed a ‘Defence Association’ on the grounds that
the directors had concealed the ﬁrm’s insolvency in the prospectus (Barnes 2007, p. 35).
William Gladstone, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, exempliﬁed the mid-nineteenth century
laissez faire response to the fraud. He argued that any shareholders bail out or prosecution of
the executives by the government would undermine shareholder responsibility for good govern-
ance and prudent investment. In the subsequent private prosecution, the shareholders claims were
dismissed and the directors acquitted (Taylor 2013, pp. 148–151).
The aftermath of Overend Gurney left shareholders with a heavy burden of responsibility, but
without the required knowledge to intervene directly in the governance of increasingly complex
organisations. The Overend Gurney collapse had followed a general boom in limited liability
companies, which after the Companies Act 1862, became a preferred option for investors as gov-
ernment savings opportunities declined. However, the collapse now led to a signiﬁcant economic
slowdown arising from an increased perception of risk, compounded by the underdeveloped state
of accountancy and auditing. (Robb 2002, Barnes 2007, p. 33, 36).
The CGB scandal of 1878 illustrated the consequences. It involved signiﬁcant misstatement
of accounts to cover up interpersonal lending and other bad loans granted by negligent directors.
The results were signiﬁcant losses to a large group of savers and effects on the wider economy
(Robb 2002, p. 73). CGB had over 1200 shareholders (Lee et al. 2008), and the response to its
failure has been partly attributed to an inﬂux of low wealth individuals unable to meet calls in
unlimited liability companies (Acheson and Turner 2008). Investors in the banking sector, vulner-
able to the systemic risks of the CGB collapse, felt the consequences of lax auditing especially
keenly, as typically high cash balances presented directors with embezzlement opportunities
(Robb 2002, p. 129). According to Jefferys (1977), public opinion, expressed as sympathy for
shareholders unable to meet calls, was instrumental in extending limited liability banking.
Along with CGB, other banks also failed, and none had arranged audits of their accounts
(Singh 2016, p. 154). As a consequence, there was an Act of parliament requiring banks to
publish annual audited balance sheets (Edwards 2013, p. 147).16 The threat to banking stability
promoted limited liability backed by: the principle of reserve liability, amalgamations, network
centralisation, inspection control and increased professionalism, leading to a downward trend
in bank fraud after 1880 (Robb 2002, pp. 74–75, Collins and Baker 2003, Inglis 1896,
p. 602.). Also, the ofﬁce of Director of Public Prosecutions was created in 1880, with responsi-
bility to investigate signiﬁcant and specialist cases. This marked a watershed in the law’s attitude
to criminalising false or non-disclosure, which, as demonstrated by the Overend Gurney outcome,
it had previously regarded as a private matter between shareholders (Taylor 2013, p. 150).
The CGB case heralded a new era for accounting and audit. There was now a rapid increase in
listed banks using professional auditors (Matthews et al. 1998, p. 48) from which the Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, founded in 1880, stood to beneﬁt.17 Distinguishing
diligent accountants from the actions of others likely to damage their reputation was an important
motive for the establishment of the Institute (Edwards et al. 2005), and guarding reputation meant
limiting auditors’ responsibilities. The Kingston Cotton Mill case of 1896 showed that by charac-
terising the fraud as ‘ingenious’ (Chandler and Edwards 1994),18 it followed that only the account-
ing profession, and not non-expert shareholder auditors, was sufﬁciently competent to investigate.
Even so, this and other cases effectively signalled to the public that accounting manipulation could
not necessarily be prevented by standard audit process, which was restricted by time and fee con-
straints (Lee et al. 2009). Following a series of high proﬁle ﬁnancial scandals in the early 1890s, the
Davey Committee was established, and recommended compulsory audit for all companies.19
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These changes increased the importance of the professional audit, and also underpinned a
general decline in fraudulent activity. Figure 1 shows that a consistent downward trend in
fraud followed the mid-century peak, as frauds associated with railways and banks also declined
(Figure 3). To succeed, ﬁnancial frauds now had to circumvent the new legal and audit safeguards,
including the disclosure requirements arising from balance sheet publication.
Against a backdrop of general decline post 1880, headline scandals increasingly demonstrated
new deﬁning features. Figure 5 shows the frequency by decade of 221 separately identiﬁable cor-
porate scandals in Britain in the period 1800–2009. As noted earlier, the 1868 Act was effective in
reducing railway fraud, and bank fraud also declined following the regulatory tightening in the
wake of CGB. In the period 1820–1879, the banking sector accounted for 63.5% of all identiﬁable
corporate scandals (47/74), but this declined to 47.8% (22/46) in the period 1880–1929. Embez-
zlement, a dominant feature of banking frauds, declined, assisted by improved audit processes
(Robb 2002, p. 137), although these were insufﬁcient to remove the problem entirely (Hollow
2015) and the decline was less steep compared to railways (Figure 3). Figure 5 also shows that
from around 1880, frauds increasingly featured the use of complex group structures, in which
control of more than one business entity played a signiﬁcant role in enabling the scandal and/
or a signiﬁcant international dimension. Control of multiple business units, transcending inter-
national borders, helped to promote insider dealing, hide losses and obfuscate the true ﬁnancial
position, posing new challenges for the accounting profession.
4.3. The Wall Street Crash and McKesson & Robbins
The rise of the large complex business, and the challenge to audit ﬁrms, was even more pro-
nounced in the US in the early twentieth century. Dicksee’s (1905, p. 8) British model still stressed
Figure 5. Corporate Scandals in the Long Run, 1800–2009. Source: Corporate Scandal database
(Appendix 1, table A1). Notes: ‘Complex group structure’ is the number of scandals by decade featuring
a complex group structure as deﬁned in Appendix 1. ‘International’ is the number of scandals by decade fea-
turing a signiﬁcant international dimension as deﬁned in Appendix 1. ‘Total’ is the total number of scandals,
by decade, as deﬁned in Appendix 1.
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that fraud detection ‘is a most important portion of the Auditor’s duties’. Three years earlier, an
address by Arthur Lowes Dickinson, reﬂecting the inﬂuence of the American model, had already
noted a shift towards the ﬁnancial condition and earnings of an enterprise (Solsma and Flesher
2013, p. 306), such that, post 1905, fraud detection was more often allocated a secondary empha-
sis, with increasing recognition of internal control testing thereafter (Brown 1962, p. 696).
The supersession of the American model reﬂected the inefﬁciency of shareholder audits based
on veriﬁcation for businesses that were increasingly large, complex and owned by portfolio
investors.
Fraudsters implicated in the Great Crash and its aftermath used complex business structures to
hide liabilities and distort value. For example, British ﬁnancier Clarence Hatry by using such
methods, according to some accounts, indirectly triggered the Wall Street Crash. He developed
a new scheme for reﬁnancing local public authority loans, and formed a Trust to amalgamate
steel ﬁrms and the collapse of these ventures in September 1929 resulted in the failure of
several investment houses, pressure on bank liquidity and a sharp fall in share prices, undermining
conﬁdence of US overseas investors (Eichengreen 2014, pp. 111–112, Galbraith 1996, p. 91).
Transatlantic ﬁnancial contagion was nothing new. In 1857, the failure of Ohio Insurance
almost resulted in the failure of CGB and other banks in the UK (Kelly and O’Grada 2000),
but the activities of Hatry added a further dimension.
These linkages aside, the US bore the relative brunt of scandalous ﬁnancial activity during and
after the Great Crash. Figure 1 shows that the general decline in British fraud, begun in the mid-
nineteenth century, continued during this period of new ﬁnancial turmoil. Figure 5 conﬁrms the
trend for headline scandals, which, as the activities of Hatry and other headline fraudsters show,
exploited complex group structures and also, limited disclosure requirements. These required
only a balance sheet and not an income statement, thus facilitating window dressing transactions
through inter-company transfers, and the use of secret reserves, illustrated respectively by the
activities of Gerard Lee Bevan in the City Equitable case and Lord Kylsant in the Royal Mail
case (Vander Weyer 2011, Arnold 1991).20
By comparison, there was an upsurge in the US in the 1920s and 1930s, mirrored by the
greater prominence of ﬁnancial scandals shown in Figure 4. These include Samuel Insull who
built up a pyramid of related companies [Insull Utility Investments Company (IUIC)] using
inﬂated asset values to water stock, and was then bankrupted in the aftermath of the crash,
leading to the collapse of the Central Republic Trust in 1932 (the ‘Dawes Bank’) (Eichengreen
2014, pp. 160–161). Another prominent case was Ivar Kreuger’s investment scam. Like IUIC,
Kruger’s empire (Krueger and Toll) consisted of a pyramid of hundred subsidiary companies
(Lee et al. 2008, p. 690). Like the Hatry and other British scandals, US fraudsters made effective
use of complex group structures, which became an increasingly prominent feature.
Also like Britain, US fraudsters exploited ﬂexible accounting rules. Insull was acquitted,
because he had complied with possible interpretations of current accounting rules.21 In drafting
the Securities Act of 1933, legislators attributed the overvaluation of stocks prior to 1929 to
accounting and now imposed conservative valuation rules (Zeff 1972). Meanwhile, the main
Stock Exchanges, in conjunction with the American Institute of Public Accountants, issued guide-
lines requiring audited ﬁnancial statements (Benston 1976). Audit scope otherwise reﬂected UK
practice, limited by excuses about cost and reliance on internal control systems, of necessity admi-
nistered by management.
However, the 1933 Act was only the ﬁrst stage of regulatory tightening, and another water-
shed scandal catalysed additional responses. McKesson & Robbins (M&R) was a diversiﬁed
drug company with operations in the US, controlled by its President F. Donald Coster, who con-
structed a Canadian operation with ﬁctitious assets totalling $17 m. The auditors, Price Water-
house (PW), ﬁled a clean report, but an SEC investigation highlighted PW’s failure to detect
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the fraud (Baxter 1999). M&R was a watershed in that different interpretations of auditor respon-
sibility were settled such that fraud detection was not a primary objective (Brown 1962, p. 700).
Auditing standards were now developed following the SEC’s reaction to the M&R scandal. They
governed receivables and inventory veriﬁcation, audit reports and appointments, but speciﬁed
limitations in terms of responsibility to detect fraud and manipulation (Lee et al. 2008,
pp. 691–692).
4.4. Penn Central and the market for corporate control
These changes inaugurated the hiatus of the period c.1940–1970, which is observable in each of
Figures 1–5. The trend is partly explained by post-M&R professional auditing standards, and SEC
adoption of conservative accounting rules, including a 30-year ban on upward asset valuations
(Benston 1969). In Britain, legal interpretations of accounting conservatism gained ground
from the late nineteenth century, as courts protected creditors from over-distribution of dividends
and investors generally from bankruptcy risk (Edwards 2013, p. 110, Kitchen 1972), 22 whilst
investors were generally satisﬁed by steady dividends (Toms 2010). Zeff (2009, p. 6) notes
that the ICAEW’s 29 non-mandatory improvements in ﬁnancial reporting practices issued
between 1942 and 1969 tended to promote conservatism. In Britain and the US following the
Royal Mail and M&K cases, companies expanded their range of accounting disclosure, and not-
withstanding rising inﬂation, accounting practice remained wedded to historical cost (Ó hÓgar-
taigh 2009, p. 170).
Accounting conservatism coincided with the concentration of the corporate economy and the
consolidation of managerial control during the hiatus period, offering further explanations for the
reduction in fraud and relative infrequency of corporate ﬁnancial scandals. Chefﬁns (2015) high-
lights corporate executives’ sense of duty and moral restraint in post-1945, as an effect of World
War Two, tight regulation of banks, personal liability which dis-incentivised risk-taking in invest-
ment banks, and improved accounting practices and disclosure. Successful ﬁrms in this period
invested in professional managerial structures and hierarchies (Chandler 1990) and ‘corporatism’
promoted monopoly in substantial sectors of the economy (Walker and Shackleton 1995). Con-
glomerate diversiﬁcation internalised risk within the ﬁrm, balancing product portfolios based on
mature life product cycles and stable markets. Tax structures encouraged the development of the
corporate bond market (Coyle and Turner 2013). Consequently, corporate executives had a rela-
tively low dependency on equity markets for new ﬁnance. These institutional arrangements did
nothing to eliminate opportunities for accounting manipulation per se, which was facilitated by
hybrid accounting rules (Chambers 1973), and corporate hierarchies could obfuscate systemic
unethical behaviour (Needleman and Needleman 1979), but they nonetheless helped suppress
headline ﬁnancial scandals during the hiatus period. From the late 1960s, corporate executives
increasingly exploited stock markets for the purposes of launching hostile takeover bids
against rivals (Toms and Wright 2005, p. 101). To some extent, with its emphasis on extending
the reach of managerially controlled ﬁrms, this new market for corporate control underpinned the
structural features of the hiatus period.
However, conglomerate diversiﬁcation also created the risk of over-extension, failure to inte-
grate subsidiaries post-merger, and, as a consequence, new incentives for executives to hide poor
performance. There were corresponding weaknesses in accounting practices relating to takeovers
and mergers. Takeover transactions could be used to manipulate asset values, earnings per share
and accounting rates of return on investment, for example Ling-Temco-Vought (LVT) and Wilson
Foods 1966–67 and a series of 40 takeover transactions by Beatrice Foods in the early 1970s
(Briloff 1969, Briloff and Engler 1979). In the UK, Stamp (1970) highlighted other US examples,
pointing to cases in the UK offering similar ﬂexibility in accounting treatment, including takeover
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transactions of textile conglomerate Courtaulds and GEC-AEI. Slater-Walker embarked on a
series of asset stripping takeover transactions, which relied heavily on accounting manipulation
to hide poor underlying performance and boost the share price, resulting in a huge ﬁnancial
scandal and banking crisis in 1974–75 (Raw 1977, Toms et al. 2015). Although leading to stricter
banking oversight regulation, Slater Walker merely heralded new scandals under new conditions
in the post-1980 period.
By contrast, the Penn Central scandal in the US was an important turning point. Under
pressure to maintain dividends in the face of poor performance, in 1970 the company became
the largest bankruptcy in history following a failed merger with New York Central and other
unsuccessful attempts at diversiﬁcation (Chefﬁns 2015, p. 725). Congressional pressure, in the
wake of Penn Central and other large frauds, led the SEC to establish the Financial Accounting
Standards Board with a view to standardising and reducing variability of accounting treatments
(Clikeman 2013, p. 73). In the face of accounting ﬂexibility on both sides of the Atlantic, auditors
encountered growing criticism for their apparent blindness in accepting the view of senior execu-
tives (Stamp 1970). In the Penn Central case, the ﬁrm’s auditors (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.)
failed to follow up questionable transactions following an agreement over lunch between Peat
Marwick’s Chairman and Penn CEO, Stuart Saunders. Peat Marwick had also collected
$600,000 from Penn for consulting work, further compromising auditor independence
(Lovings 2006, p. 86). In response, in 1972, the SEC now strengthened recommendations ﬁrst
mooted after McKeeson Robbins for mandatory audit committees composed of independent
directors (DeZoort 1997, p. 211), whilst the 1977 Metcalf Report into the ‘Accounting establish-
ment’ on behalf of Congress called for more independent oversight of accounting and auditing
standards.23
There were parallel developments in the UK. The London and Counties Securities fraud in
1973 revealed weaknesses in self-regulated audit processes, leading to a tightening of regulation,
albeit of questionable effectiveness (Matthews 2005). The scandal at Robert Maxwell’s Pergamon
Press also had common features with Penn Central, most notably ﬂattering proﬁts for the purposes
of a takeover transaction and, again, compromised auditor independence (Rutherford 2007, p. 5).
Raw (1977, p. 196) notes parallels between Slater Walker and LVT in the 1960s in terms of
accounting manipulation in subsidiary companies. The Pergamon scandal, along with the
GEC-AEI affair and others added to the demand identiﬁed by Stamp (1970) for greater uniformity
and comparability of accounting treatments, leading to the establishment of the Accounting Stan-
dards Committee and the development of Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAPs).
Penn Central and other scandals of the late 1960s and early 1970s marked the beginning of an
era of self-regulation through agreed standards. They also marked the end of the hiatus, and a new
period of increasing fraud, ﬁnancial scandal and corruption. Accounting and auditing standards
were at best a necessary condition for limiting this new wave of scandal; at worst, they now
became part of the problem.
4.5. The big bang and Polly Peck
The hiatus period was ending by the early 1970s, and the incidence of ﬁnancial scandals
climbed dramatically thereafter (Figures 1, 4 and 5). Financial repression, or the constraints
on the development of ﬁnancial markets imposed through monetary policy and bank regu-
lation that prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s, was now reversed (Crafts 2016). Changes in
regulatory and market structure around this time created new opportunities for accounting
manipulation, used to great effect in the wave of scandals of the later 1980s, of which
Polly Peck was a leading example. Not only did fraud and ﬁnancial scandal increase, but
their character also changed dramatically.
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Earlier scandals had sometimes featured an overseas element, which evolved in parallel to
changing geopolitical conditions. For example, Slater Walker had taken advantage of the
Bahamas and Jersey in the late 1960s to avoid exchange controls and facilitate speculative invest-
ment in Hong Kong (Raw 1977, p. 309, 317–319). Such capital transfers were commonly routed
through the Bahamas up until 1973, when a change of government led to their diversion, mostly to
the Cayman Islands (Shaxson 2012, p. 106). As the British Empire declined, the City of London
also shifted its international priorities. London and international banks increasingly turned their
attention to the growing Eurodollar market in the 1960s (Cain and Hopkins 2016, p. 12),24
which exploited a loophole in the Bretton Woods system. Meanwhile, the end of formal
Empire, and the contraction of the Sterling Area in 1972 led to the encouragement of new ﬁnan-
cial services activities in the residual British administered overseas territories. Developments in
air transport and ofﬁce technology, such as facsimile machines and later computerisation, facili-
tated the transfer of funds via the Cayman Islands and similar offshore centres (Palan et al. 2010,
pp. 140–141; Shaxson 2012, p. 108). Removal of restrictions on the international movement of
capital in 1979 facilitated such transactions. Prior to that, from 1947 legislation restricted monet-
ary transactions with foreign territories, which under Bretton Woods,25 meant in practice to those
accompanying trade in goods (Bank of England 1977).
From around 1980 the internationalisation of ﬁnance provided greater scope for accounting
manipulation, and lay at the heart of a majority of ﬁnancial scandals (Figure 5). Of 88 scandals
in the database post-1970, 60.2% (53/88) featured a signiﬁcant international dimension.26 Similar
and complementary opportunities were provided by deregulation of the banking and corporate
sectors, encouraging further restructuring. Smith (1992) points to the dramatic increase in take-
over and other corporate restructuring transactions, which, following deregulation, were
hatched in the City’s corporate ﬁnance departments rather than boardrooms. Removal of restric-
tions on ﬁnancial assistance for the purchase of a company’s own shares accelerated the buyout
market in the 1980s, facilitating the disposal of subsidiaries, and the business of buying and
selling companies more generally (Toms et al. 2015).27 Figure 5 shows that complex group struc-
tures featured in the substantial majority of corporate scandals post-1970. Of the 88 scandals,
72.7% signiﬁcantly involved complex structures.28
Internationalisation and restructuring facilitated accounting manipulation (Smith 1992),
which, taken together, are illustrated by the Polly Peck scandal. The company was ﬂoated in
1982 with chief executive Asil Nadir retaining a dominant 25% stake. It then expanded rapidly
through takeover transactions, including two signiﬁcant ones in 1989: Del Monte and Sansui.
Requirements for further associated restructuring placed pressure on Polly Peck’s relationship
with 100 or so bank creditors. Substantial deposits held in northern Cyprus were inaccessible
to creditors and assets held there were of questionable value. The Polly Peck share price collapsed
as the banks disposed of shares held as security on their loans. The shares were suspended on 20th
September 1990, and the ensuing bankruptcy left the shareholders with a deﬁcit of £384 m (Smith
1992, pp. 7–8; 221–223). In 1990 a Serious Fraud Ofﬁce investigation revealed a £927 m shortfall
in inter-company balances, caused by Nadir’s private transfers via Turkish subsidiaries, exploiting
SSAP2029 rules to exaggerate their asset values (Gwilliam and Jackson 2011). Like Polly Peck,
Mirror Group (Robert Maxwell), Coloroll, Bank of Credit Commerce International (BCCI), and
British & Commonwealth, all reported proﬁts compliant with accounting standards before going
bust (Smith 1992).
The developing pace of corporate restructuring and internationalisation of the ﬁnancial sector
coloured these and most other ﬁnancial scandals of the 1980s. The Johnson Matthey banking col-
lapse and Bank of England bailout of 1984 arose from risky lending and overexposure to the
Pakistani shipping magnate and international commodity trader, Mahmud Sipra, whose El
Saaed group was protected using a Liberian registration.30 Ivan Boesky, the New York-based
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arbitrageur, and ofﬁcers of Morgan Grenfell, were implicated in the Guinness share support
scandal of 1986 (Naylor 2004, pp. 396–397). The Barlow Clowes scandal of 1988, which was
effectively a Ponzi scheme, featured a Jersey afﬁliate used to book non-existent software sales
(Brooks 2018, p. 89). Also in 1988, ﬁve executives of Bank of Credit Commerce International
(BCCI) were indicted in Florida on charges of international money laundering, centred on
London, but operating through offshore accounts including the Cayman Islands and Luxembourg
(Beaty and Gwynne 1993, p. 213). The investigation culminated in 1991, then described as ‘the
largest bank fraud in world history’31 and to a large degree explains the spike in the bank fraud
index for that year in Figure 3. Robert Maxwell’s business empire, which collapsed in 1991, con-
sisted of hundreds of interlocked companies, controlled via family trusts registered in Lichtenstein
(Blowﬁeld and Murray 2008, p. 172). In all these cases, the construction of a complex group
structure across international jurisdictions created new opportunities for shifting funds and
proﬁts, thereby escaping accountability.
Polly Peck and coterminous frauds showed that ﬂexibility in accounting standards gave
executives the means to satisfy stock market expectations of growth, at the same time hiding
poor performance arising from risky investments and over-expansion. Executives could transfer
assets and liabilities between international afﬁliates and secure protection using secrecy jurisdic-
tions, further attenuating audit scrutiny, and increasing auditor dependence on senior manage-
ment. Such were the challenges for Polly Peck’s auditor, Stoy Hayward, which placed undue
reliance on subsidiary auditors and uncorroborated assurances from Nadir (Gwilliam and
Jackson 2011, p. 398). Deﬁcient auditing was also implicated in the Johnson Matthey collapse,
leading to calls for enhanced audit scrutiny for ﬁnancial institutions, and PW were criticised
for lack zeal in the face of international banking secrecy and links to Arab Gulf states in the
BCCI case.32 Coopers & Lybrand’s audit staff were required to be at the ‘beck and call’ of
Maxwell and his staff (Brooks 2018, pp. 88–91). Given such difﬁculties, auditors could be for-
given for wishing to limit their risks and potential liabilities, and were assisted when the
Caparo case limited their responsibilities towards investors and employees on grounds of
remoteness.33
Following Polly Peck and other scandals of the late 1980s, there were moves to improve
accounting standards and corporate governance. Reform of the former would restrict opportunity
for accounting manipulation, and the latter would potentially reign in the excesses of over-power-
ful CEOs like Nadir and Maxwell. The newly formed Accounting Standards Board revised
accounting practice highlighted as deﬁcient in the Polly Peck case, including cash ﬂow state-
ments, off-balance sheet ﬁnance and foreign currency translation. The emphasis of these
changes, on principles rather than rules, differentiated the UK from the US. A similar impetus
was given to the reforms initiated by the Cadbury Committee on Corporate Governance (Gwil-
liam and Jackson 2011, pp. 399–400). The combined consequence of these scandals was that
the UK had begun to tackle accounting and governance reform ahead of the US, where similar
developments, in the form of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, followed the wave of scandals involving
Enron and others in the early 2000s (Toms and Wright 2005).
The wider effectiveness of national level reforms in the UK and US remains open to question.
Even if acknowledged as moves in the right direction (the subject of some debate, see, for
example, Spira 2003, Unerman and O’Dwyer 2004), the opportunities for ﬁnancial subterfuge
arising from international loopholes in the rebound phase continue to mount. From zero in
1977 the number of offshore shell companies registered annually by Mossack Fonseca in
Panama alone reached a peak of 13,287 in 2005.34 The growth of quasi-legal spaces and regulat-
ory avoidance, originating with the London Euromarket, was further strengthened by the devel-
opment of unregulated ﬁnancial intermediation (Palan and Nesvetailova 2014), which played a
crucial role in the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2008 and its associated collapses and scandals.
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Reconsidering the longer run trends in Figures 1–5, there are several possible explanations for
the U-shape of fraud and ﬁnancial scandal in the twentieth century. The pattern corresponds quite
closely to other prominent trends in the ﬁnancial sector for the same period including the level of
regulation and the character and remuneration of ﬁnancial labour. The level of ﬁnancial (de)/regu-
lation in Philippon and Reshef’s (2012) index coincides not only with the observable pattern of
fraud in the period 1910–2010, but also with wages in the ﬁnancial sector. They explain the rela-
tive decline in ﬁnancial sector wages up to c.1975 by deskilling and routinisation, a trend which
overlapped with the post-1945 rise of the techno-structure and associated research and technical
work in large industrial corporations (Galbraith 1967). From the mid-1970s onwards, ﬁnance
sector employment was increasingly characterised by higher-level decision-making and analytical
job complexity, associated with a rapid rise in relative wages and internationalisation. Concomi-
tantly, these increases have rapidly outstripped the wages paid to staff in regulatory functions
(Philippon and Reshef 2012).35 In identiﬁable headline scandal cases, bank fraud, having declined
up to 1980, began to rise again thereafter (table A1), a trend also observable in Figure 3. In the
period 2000–2009, banking and ﬁnance accounted for 14 of 22 headline frauds, or 63.6%, a ﬁgure
comparable with banking’s unregulated phase in the mid-nineteenth century. Taken together, the
evidence suggests that the increasing scale and complexity of the ﬁnance sector, and associated
power imbalances between regulator and regulated explain the rebound in fraud and ﬁnancial
scandals in the second half of the twentieth century, up to and including the global ﬁnancial crisis.
5. Conclusions
The above discussion has focused on opportunity, without mapping the motivations and
rationalisations of the individuals involved onto the long run trends. Further research might
address these points, along with changes in social norms and standards of ethical behaviour
that go beyond the broad trends indicated in Figures 1 and 2. Media reports have been used
to quantify these trends, but another area of further research would be to analyse the role of
such reports in constructing the response narrative following major scandals. These caveats
aside, in the 300 years or so covered in Figures 1–5, assuming that human nature and the
fraction of individuals in society pre-disposed to fraudulent behaviour has remained reason-
ably constant, the evidence reveals that the opportunity set available to potential fraudsters,
their modus operandi and factors enhancing or mitigating the risks they face have changed
dramatically.
The history of fraud and ﬁnancial scandal in the long view calls some prior interpretations into
question. Whereas there are cycles, there is also a longer run secular element, reﬂecting insti-
tutional conﬁgurations, and not just scandals or clusters of scandals. Skeel’s (2005) ‘cat and
mouse’ analogy, in which regulators respond to scandals by empowering market scrutineers,
including accountants, only works within speciﬁc time bounds and jurisdictions. It does not
explain why the incidence of fraud and ﬁnancial scandal declined after the South Sea Bubble
as a function of focused shareholder knowledge and empowerment, nor why corporate executives
eschewed manipulative ﬁnancial behaviour in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, the hiatus period is
problematic for most behavioural interpretations, including those based on the actions of domi-
nant senior management (for example Lee et al. 2008). Corporate managements were at the
height of their power and built large technocratic hierarchies in the absence of signiﬁcant share-
holder or ﬁnancial market scrutiny. Only occasionally, typically during a takeover situation, did
managers resort to accounting manipulation to enhance their bids or to hide poor performance.
Balleisen’s (2017) dilemma, of striking a regulatory balance between promoting risk-taking
and entrepreneurship and the discouragement of ﬁnancial manipulation, is well illustrated. Cor-
porate hierarchies and tight ﬁnancial regulation mitigated fraud after 1933, but they also
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caused Schumpeter (1942) to lament the demise of the entrepreneur, which was compounded by
the rise of the technocrats of Galbraith’s (1967) ‘new industrial state’.
Since the mid-1970s, the ‘cat and mouse’ analogy seems to hold better. Certainly, there were
focused attempts to improve accounting and auditing standards in direct response to speciﬁc scan-
dals at Penn Central and inter alia, Polly Peck. However, the expansion, complexity, internatio-
nalisation and economic dominance of the ﬁnancial sector have created an oversize mouse stalked
cautiously at a distance by the scrawny malnourished regulatory cat. These changes have also
created a plethora of business advice type opportunities for the accounting profession, but also
present much greater risk in terms of the possibility of fraud and difﬁculty in its detection.
Fraud opportunity and risk is a function of specialisation, growth, diversiﬁcation and business
complexity and regulatory effectiveness. Where investors’ wealth is wholly and exclusively com-
mitted to a business that is also functionally specialised, arguably such opportunities and risks can
be minimised, as demonstrated by the effectiveness of shareholder investigation committees
before 1845. Mature product markets and improved regulation can also combine to reduce the
incidence of fraud as demonstrated by the secular decline in fraud in the second half of the nine-
teenth century. Accounting conservatism, legislated in the UK during this time, and in the US
post-1933, provided effective protection for diversiﬁed investors interested mostly in steady divi-
dends. Similarly, if managers can satisfy their wealth targets through controlled diversiﬁcation, as
in the period c.1940–1970, their predisposition to fraud and accounting manipulation may dimin-
ish, even in the absence of outside investor scrutiny. Whereas fraud and scandal may reduce in
such conditions, there are nonetheless trade-offs in terms of sub-optimal shareholder value out-
comes. The imperative to release such value, coupled with increased complexity associated
with ﬁnancial innovation and deregulation, has been associated with an upsurge in fraud and
ﬁnancial scandal since the mid-1970s.
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Notes
1. The second and third elements follow from the deﬁnition of ‘scandal’: https://en.oxforddictionaries.
com, with the addition of ‘ﬁnancial’ implying the involvement of ﬁnancial resources.
2. Throughout the paper, keyword search terms are indicated in double quotes.
3. I conducted similar tests using the New York Times historical online database hosted by Proquest, cov-
erering the period 1850–2009.
4. ‘Swindle’ peaked in 1877 and ‘false balance sheet’ in 1893; occasional earlier references aside, ‘crea-
tive accounting’ only entered general use after 1983 (Gale Cengage online database of British
newspapers).
5. See Hail et al. (2108) ﬁgures 3 and 4 respectively, based on ‘scandal’ and related terms in the Financial
Times, 1888–2015 and New York Times, 1850–2015.
6. Known as the Bubble Act, 1720 (c.18, Geo. I, 6).
Accounting and Business Research 493
7. A further peak in 1777 was fuelled in part by government ofﬁcials’ corruption in military procurement,
and also the activities of the fraudster David Brown Dignan, made famous for fabricating a conspiracy
to kill the king in which the Duke of Suffolk and the Earl of Shelburne were named as co-conspirators
(Jackson 1795, p. 237).
8. The Newgate Calendar (Jackson 1795), chronicles instances of forgery and swindling as headline
classes of crime during the eighteenth century.
9. Joint Stock Companies Registration and Regulation Act 1844 (c.110, Vict. 7 & 8) permitted incorpor-
ation of companies by registration. Limited Liability Act 1855 (c.133, Vict., 8 & 19) permitted incor-
poration of companies with limited liability for the ﬁrst time.
10. British Parliamentary Papers, ‘Irish Great Western Railway Bill’, House of Lords Hansard Sessional
Papers, 1845, 25th and 29th July, 1845; ‘The stagging system’, The Times, 1st August, 1845, p.5.
11. Railway investors incorporated dividends into net return calculations on aggregated classes of capital
to assess comparative performance (Toms 2010, Tyler 1873).
12. In Burnes v. Pennell (1849) 2 H.L.C. 497, ﬁnancial statements could not be fraudulent where they
accounted for ‘certainties but not risks’ (Reid 1987, pp. 26–27).
13. Regulation of Railways Act, 1868 (c.119, Vict. 31 and 32).
14. Corporate scandal database, appendix 1; a further isolated railway fraud, not speciﬁcally covered by
the 1868 Act, occurred in connection with a tramway ﬂotation by Ernest Terah Hooley in 1904.
15. Larceny is deﬁned as the application of company funds for own use; embezzlement is deﬁned as the
receipt of money by the company with intent to defraud (Taylor 2013, p. 111).
16. Companies Act 1879 (c.76, Vict. 42 and 43).
17. Restrictions on entry to embryonic societies meant that London dominated the Institute from the begin-
ning (Matthews et al. 1998, p. 59).
18. Re Kingston Cotton Mill Company (No.2) Ch.331, The Accountant Law Reports, 23rd May, 1896, p.78.
19. Companies Act 1900 (c.48, Vict. 63 and 64). Following the Barings crisis of 1890, these scandals were
centred largely on individual ﬁnancial promoters, including Jabez Balfour, Ernest Terah Hooley and
Horatio Bottomley (Johnston 1934).
20. Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. (1925) Ch. 407; R. v. Kylsant, (1931) 48 T. L. R. 62. For further
examples of Hatry’s activities, see Swinson (2017).
21. In the Royal Mail case, for similar reasons, Kylsant was found not guilty of accounting manipulation.
R. v. Kylsant, (1931) 48 T. L. R. 62.
22. The Trevor v Whitworth (1887, 12 AC 409 HL) case, explicitly endorsed capital maintenance on the
grounds of creditor protection. The conservatism principle was formally stated by L.J. Buckley in
1906: Newton vs. Birmingham Small Arms Co Ltd (2 Ch 378:22 T.L.R. 664)
23. Senate Report No. 95–34 (1977), The Accounting Establishment: A Staff Study, prepared by the Sub-
committee on Reports, Accounting and Management of the Committee on Government Operations.
24. Now referred to as the Euromarket; London remains at its centre.
25. Exchange Control Act 1947 (ch.14, Geo. VI. 10/11); the system of ﬁxed exchange rates and capital
controls was inaugurated in 1944 (Helleiner 2015); controls were abolished under the Exchange
Control (General Exemption) Order, 13th December, 1979.
26. The equivalent pre 1970 ﬁgure was 23.3% (31/133). Of the 53 post 1970 scandals, over half (30)
involved offshore secrecy jurisdictions.
27. Legislation on ﬁnancial deregulation included the Companies Act 1981, which introduced exceptions
to the ﬁnancial assistance rules and the Financial Services Act (c.60, 1986), and which facilitated diver-
siﬁcation and integration of banking and ﬁnancial services,
28. The equivalent ﬁgure for pre 1970 was 13.5% (18/133).
29. Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 20: Foreign Currency Translation, in force between 1983
and 2003.
30. Wall Street Journal, 31st October 1984.
31. David Lascelles and Richard Waters, ‘BCCI shutdown’, Financial Times, 30th July 1991, p.6.
32. Clive Woolman, ‘In search of fresh paths through the fraud jungle’, Financial Times, 15th March
1986, p.8; Alex Brummer, ‘A Banking Scandal with Global Signals for the Regulators’, Guardian,
6th July, 1991.
33. Caparo Industries PLC v Dickman [1990] UKHL 2. At around the same time LLPs were allowed in the
US, which Brooks (2018) attributes to a state-by-state regulatory race to the bottom.
34. The cumulative total during this period was over 200,000. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/04/
where-are-the-worlds-tax-havens-and-what-are-they-used-for/ (accessed 1st November 2018).
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35. The ratio of executive compensation in ﬁnance (the top regulated) to the highest salaries paid to (non-
politically appointed) regulators (the top regulators) grew from 10 in 1980 to over 60 in 2005 (or 40,
excluding bonuses; Philippon and Reshef 2012, p. 1606).
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Appendix 1
The appendix describes the steps involved in constructing a database of headline corporate scandals in the
United Kingdom, for the period 1800–2009 and provides a summary of the characteristics of the resulting
sample.
Construction of the sample
I identiﬁed headline accounting scandals using keyword searches from online newspaper archives (hosted by
Cengage) and featuring inter alia the British Library Newspaper Archive, 1800–1950, The Times Digital
Archive, 1800–2009, the Financial Times Historical Archive (1888–2009) and The Economist Historical
Archive, 1843–2009.
Key search terms:
‘Fraud’, ‘corruption’, ‘embezzlement’, ‘Financial scandal’, ‘accounting scandal’, ‘false balance sheet’,
‘creative accounting’.
‘Board [Department] of Trade investigation’ (1840–1969) ‘Department of Trade Investigation’, ‘Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry Investigation’ (1970–2007), ‘Serious Fraud Ofﬁce Investigation’ (1987–2009).
Keywords for ‘Financial scandal’ identiﬁed only isolated instances prior to 1850. I complemented the
keyword searches with searches of secondary literature. The following works were signiﬁcantly relied
upon for this purpose: Freeman et al. (2012), Gwilliam and Jackson (2011), Jones (2011), Johnston
(1934), Lee et al. (2008), Robb (2002), and Taylor (2013).
Once identiﬁed, I subjected each scandal to further keyword searches with reference to the name of the
organisation(s) involved, dates, and key individuals.
The keyword searches and secondary literature were also used to ascertain the major features of each
scandal. To be classiﬁed as a ﬁnancial scandal an event must involve the use of ﬁnancial resources, in a
morally questionable or illegal fashion, with signiﬁcant impact on third parties, and attract wide publicity.
To meet the latter criterion, there must have been at least one headline reference in a national newspaper.
The date of the scandal was assigned according to the year in which the facts of the case were publicised
as headline news (often sometime after the fraud was actually perpetrated; often sometime before the case
was resolved and offenders punished). Scandals that featured more than one business unit, either as conso-
lidated subsidiaries or associated group members, or as connected via an individual signiﬁcantly implicated
in the scandal, were classiﬁed as ‘complex group’. This term is used a) to distinguish from scandals involving
a single business unit and b) to reﬂect the compounding of fraud opportunity where potential perpetrators can
transfer resources and liabilities to differently constituted legal entities. Where the use of more than one inter-
national legal jurisdiction was a necessary condition for a material part of the scandal, including crown
dependencies and overseas territories with signiﬁcant independence from the UK in terms of ﬁnancial regu-
lation, the scandal was classiﬁed as having an ‘international dimension’. In each case the non-UK jurisdiction
was noted in the database. Scandals involving businesses whose core activities included banking and ﬁnan-
cial services were classiﬁed as ‘banking/ﬁnance’.
Using this approach, 221 headline corporate scandals were identiﬁed. Their pattern of occurrence by
decade is similar to that demonstrated by the data collected by Hail et al. 2018, also listed for comparative
purposes in Table A.1 below.
Table A1. Headline scandals by decade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Decade Total Complex Group Int. Dimension Banking/ ﬁnance Hail et al.
1800 2 0 0 0 0
1810 0 0 0 0 1
1820 7 0 0 2 2
1830 3 1 0 3 2
1840 24 0 0 15 11
1850 21 0 2 16 16
1860 14 1 3 9 9
(Continued)
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Table A1. Continued.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Decade Total Complex Group Int. Dimension Banking/ ﬁnance Hail et al.
1870 5 0 3 2 5
1880 3 0 2 1 8
1890 16 3 3 6 21
1900 12 3 6 4 12
1910 4 0 2 3 11
1920 11 6 1 8 6
1930 9 3 2 4 6
1940 0 0 0 0 0
1950 0 0 0 0 0
1960 2 1 1 0 3
1970 16 7 6 5 30
1980 21 16 15 9 23
1990 29 27 20 13 23
2000 22 14 12 14 23
Total 221 82 78 114 212
Sources: First section of Appendix 1: ‘Construction of the sample’; Hail et al. (2018) online appendix:
https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/arc/docs/journal/online-supplements/htw-online-
appendix.pdf?la=en&hash=3425BEDF072AEF29C3E8927AA5C5A6BE45B8913Btable A25.2 (accessed
25th October, 2018).
Notes:
(1) The total number of scandals, by decade, identiﬁed by the procedure described in the ﬁrst section of
the appendix.
(2) Scandals by decade that fall into the ‘complex group’ category identiﬁed by the procedure described
in the ﬁrst section of the appendix.
(3) Scandals by decade that fall into the ‘international dimension’ category identiﬁed by the procedure
described in the ﬁrst section of the appendix.
(4) Scandals by decade that fall into the ‘banking and ﬁnance’ category identiﬁed by the procedure
described in the ﬁrst section of the appendix.
(5) Hail et al. identify a total 212 scandals, which they analyse by decade, but without disclosing the
details of each scandal. Signiﬁcant overlaps, but also some differences are therefore likely. The Pearson
(Spearman) correlation co-efﬁcient for the data in columns (1) and (5) is 0.814 (0.877).
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